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REFLECTIONS ON EMPLOYEE VOICE AND
REPRESENTATION FOR THE FUTURE
PETER D. SHERER*
The New Deal legislation, the Wagner Act and its amendments,'
institutionalized a form of employee voice and representation (EVR)
that featured employers and unions as adversaries. This legislation
endured despite its growing inability to deal with changing organiza-
tional realities. These new realities have resulted in a great deal of
local experimentation with forms of EVR outside of the legal regime
of the New Deal legislation. During this time, organized labor and
national lawmakers have in effect sat back and allowed this experi-
mentation to go on, only occasionally speaking out against these new
forms of EVR or urging their wider diffusion.
There now appears to be something of a consensus that the New
Deal legislation no longer works at promoting EVR,2 particularly be-
cause it seems irrelevant if not a thorn in the side of the large nonun-
ion sector. Coupled with the growing awareness in industry and in
government that human resource management (HRM) matters for
competitive advantage and that EVR is a key HRM policy and prac-
tice, discussion of EVR has moved closer to center stage. The time is
propitious for considering the role of labor law in promoting EVR.
Each of the authors in this Symposium makes use of law to pro-
pose a model of what EVR should look like in the future. These au-
thors, however, express a wide variety of views on how the law should
be modified. Their diversity of views mirrors the diversity in forms of
EVR that now exists, suggesting that the role of law should not be to
favor any one model of EVR over another, but to promote EVR more
generally through enabling variety to emerge and flourish.
* Associate Professor of Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Conversations with Janice Bellace, Huseyin Leblebici, and David Lewin have contributed to my
reflections in this essay.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
2. See THoMAs A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (1986).
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I. THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES
Since the time of the New Deal legislation, organizations and
their labor primarily have had principal-agent or employment rela-
tionships in which the employer acted as a monitor and controller.3
The employer qua principal monitored and controlled what and how
his/her employees qua agents accomplished work activities. These or-
ganizations were hierarchical because of their concern with monitor-
ing employees.
The New Deal model, with the union acting as an adversary to
management, had a certain logic in these organizations. The union
moderated management prerogatives over monitoring and controlling
the workforce, and it redistributed profits in favor of employees and
away from stockholders.
Increased product market competition both at home and abroad
has lead many firms to depart from these traditional employment rela-
tionships. 4 One alternative response has been for organizations to
adopt more relational employment models, dedicating employees to
their firms through lifetime employment, empowerment, and the like.
The aim of organizations with these models is to have employees with
dedicated assets who will provide their firms with dedicated capabili-
ties. Flexibility and innovation in these organizations arise through
employee commitment and loyalty. These organizations are invaria-
bly leaner and flatter than their traditional hierarchical counterparts.
The EVR implications with such relational models are clear.
Firms must give their employees a larger voice in strategy formulation
and implementation. For such firms, EVR becomes embedded in the
3. For more on this, see David Lewin & Peter D. Sherer, Does Strategic Choice Explain
Senior Executives' Preferences on Employee Voice and Representation?, in EMPLOYEE REPRE-
SENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTrURE DIRECTIONS 235 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M.
Kleiner eds., 1993); Peter D. Sherer & Kyungmook Lee, Variation from the Standard Employ-
ment Relationship: The Character and Determinants of RRTs, ATAs, and CIRs (1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter
Variation from the Standard Employment Relationship]. For the classic statement in support of
the hierarchical firm, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
4. This argument draws from Peter D. Sherer, Variety and Selection in Organization-La-
bor Relationships: A Macro Organizational and Strategic Framework to Human Resource Man-
agement (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania). For more on the topic, see RICHARD BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE
GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (National Plan-
ning Association Report No. 239, 1989); PETER B. DOERINOER ET AL., TURBULENCE IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1991); PAUL OSTERMAN, EMPLOYMENT FUTRES (1988); Jeffrey Pfef-
fer & James Baron, Taking the Workers Back Out: Recent Trends in the Structuring of Employ-
ment, in 10 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 257 (Barry M. Staw & Larry L.
Cummings eds., 1988).
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way the organization manages its human resources. Indeed, the com-
mon separation between working and "voicing" becomes less visible,
if at all visible, in such organizations.
Another alternative response has been for organizations to have
more transactional relationships with labor, deploying labor with as
much fluidity as possible. Organizations have done this largely
through contracting in relationships with independent contractors,
free lancers, and the like.5 The aim of organizations with these trans-
actional models is to have fluid human assets that will allow for fluid
capabilities. Flexibility and innovation arise through the flow of
human capital in and out of organizations. These organizations are
also lean and flat, if not hollow, as compared to their traditional hier-
archical counterparts.
The EVR implications with these transactional relationships may
not be immediately obvious but they are potentially very important.
Just as craft unions in the 1800s once trained and aided the mobility of
labor from one locale to another through traveling cards, so too can
labor organizations provide training and take the friction out of mo-
bility for contracted in workers. 6 As Joel Rogers persuasively argues
in this Symposium, labor organizations, in taking such a role, not only
legitimize themselves with workers, but they also make themselves at-
tractive to the many firms who need well trained workers. 7
Competition has also had an effect on employee attitudes about
EVR. As Michael Gottesman clearly points out, many employees
have become much more concerned with their firms' competitive posi-
tion.8 These employees do not want to lose good jobs because they
are hard to come by. Indeed, despite the fact that many workers are
working harder and have not seen significant increases in their real
wages, employee dissatisfaction hardly seems to be a pressing issue
today. Many employees do not want forms of EVR, particularly un-
ions, that create sharp differences between them and their employers.
5. The legal relationships between the organization and the labor often falls between the
cracks of independent contractor relationships with and without agency. They are not fully in
the capacity of employees nor are they fully outsiders in these organizations. I use the term
"contracting in relationships" to refer to the many situations in which there is such a partial, or
quasi-agency, relationship.
6. See Peter D. Sherer & Huseyin Leblebici, The Formation and Transformation of Na-
tional Unions: A Generative Approach to the Evolution of Labor Organizations, in 12 RESEARCH
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 75 (1993). See generally LLOYD ULMAN, THE RISE OF
THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION (2d ed. 1966).
7. See Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 97 (1993).
8. Michael Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining A Labor Law for Unorgan-
ized Workers, 69 CH.-KENT L. REV. 59, 65 (1993).
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Those who work in services, especially the well educated, are apt to be
turned off by labor organizations that challenge employers through
bluff, bluster, and strikes. Such employees appear to be persuaded by
organizations that have knowledge and expertise.
Competition may be having a different effect on the attitudes of
other workers, particularly those who are contracted in, are operating
as "free agents employees," or in some other way no longer are per-
manently attached to one employer. These more nomadic or mobile
workers no longer have the commitment and loyalty that they once
felt for their employer and they operate more on the notion of having
employability as opposed to employment security.9 For these work-
ers, exit may be viewed as a better option than voice.
The changing composition of the labor force also has important
implications for EVR. The widely cited Workforce 2000 makes it dra-
matically clear that white males will no longer dominate the labor
market, especially at entry points, as they once did. 10 Women, African
Americans, Hispanic Americans, and a multitude of immigrants will
diversify the labor market and organizations, and they have the poten-
tial to have a very real impact on EVR. Alan Hyde's discussion of
black caucus groups shows how minority concerns in a firm can be-
come actualized into a group voice that may in fact be illegal under
the New Deal legislation."
II. THE UNION RESPONSE
Despite the highly visible self-analysis by the American labor
movement in the AFL-CIO report by the Committee on the Evolu-
tion of Work of 1985, national unions have changed little.12 They re-
main the dominant form of labor organization, dwarfing subsidiary
local unions, independent local unions, and intermediary bodies such
as city centrals and regional federations of different unions.13
The dominance of national unions stifles experimentation with al-
ternative forms of EVR. As Sam Estreicher points out in this Sympo-
sium, national unions as multi-employer organizations make it very
9. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The New Managerial Work, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1989, at 85, 92; see also Steve Lohr, Fewer Ties Are Bonding Workers to Corporations, N.Y.
TIMES, August 14, 1992, at Al.
10. See WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & ARNOLD E. PACKER, WORKFORCE 2000 (1987).
11. See Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employ-
ment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 172-77 (1993).
12. See COMMITTEE ON THE EvOLUTION OF WORK, AFL-CIO, THE CHANGING SITUATION
OF WORKERS AND THEIR UNIONS (1985)[hereinafter THE CHANGING SrruATON].
13. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see generally Sherer & Leblebici, supra note 6.
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difficult for firms to share proprietary information with the union, or
to get labor costs attuned to a single firm.14 As a result, experimenta-
tion with enterprise-like unionism is stunted. Yet, as Michael Gottes-
man suggests, enterprise unionism would seem to be what many
unionized employees would prefer, since they want their firm to win
in the competition among employers. 15
Another key component to traditional unionism is the selection
rule that membership is a product of being a member of a union and
being a party to a labor contract.16 The basic premise was that a union
member needed a union contract in order for the union to be able to
take wages out of the competition. As Matt Finkin points out in this
Symposium, this selection rule was written into the New Deal legisla-
tion as majority rule and exclusive representation. 17 Membership-by-
contract provided the needed instrument of power for the national
unions both with respect to their members and employers. Yet, mem-
bership-by-contract meant no union members if less than fifty percent
of a bargaining unit voted for the union. Membership-by-contract be-
came a problem when unions lost many more elections than they won
and they were not able to secure first contracts.
The labor movement's highly visible alternative to membership-
by-contract was associate unionism.' 8 Associate unions are based on
the idea that union membership does not require coverage by a collec-
tive bargaining contract. As Michael Gottesman suggests in this Sym-
posium, associate-like unions could act as service providers to
nonunion workers by providing expertise, training and counsel, and
benefits for workers that would be too costly for them to purchase as
individuals.' 9 To date, however, associate unionism has not had a ma-
jor impact on reviving the American labor movement.
14. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in A World of Competetive Product Markets, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 11 (1993).
15. Gottesman, supra note 8, at 67-68.
16. See Sherer & Leblebici, supra note 6.
17. See Matthew W. inkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Em-
ployee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1993).
18. See THE CHANGING SITUATION, supra note 12, at 18-29. See also CHARLES C. HECK-
SCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM 177-91 (1988); Peter D. Sherer & Huseyin Leblebici, Union Mem-
bership Rules: What Do They Tell Us About Alternative Union Form in the Past, Present, and
Future?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 74 (John F. Burton, Jr., ed. 1990); Paul Jarley & Jack Fiorito,
Associate Membership: Unionism or Consumerism, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 209 (1990).
19. Gottesman, supra note 8, at 80-83.
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III. THE ROLE OF LAW: LAGGING OR ENABLING?
The proposals for promoting EVR in this Symposium range from
fairly specific and narrow changes to major changes that require us to
rethink a larger set of social institutions. Where there is a great deal
of unity is in proposals for relaxing or narrowing section 8(a)(2) of the
Wagner Act.20 These proposals, with Clyde Summers' being the most
reasoned and detailed statement on this matter, are aimed at encour-
aging nonunion employers to have employee involvement or partici-
pation plans when they do not actively subvert unions.21 The main
encouragement in these proposals is to strip away legal prohibitions
against employee involvement and participation plans. Such a change
in law might be expected to tip the balance toward participation plans
for those employers at the margin.
What is clear, though, is that many organizations in the nonunion
sector already have such plans.22 Involvement teams, participation
plans, and the like are now "best practices" in many managements'
eyes. Business schools all around the country teach the virtues of us-
ing these practices. Many employers in fact believe that participation
plans are useful. The issue here seems to be how much the law wants
to lag organizational realities.
For those who contend that such plans are simply shams, Alan
Hyde's example of Tekko illustrates that employee voice without un-
ions can make a difference. 23 His example of the black caucus groups
at Xerox illustrates too that initially local and somewhat informal
groups arise to pursue their common concerns outside of unions and
that these group voices do make a difference. 24 Both these examples
further suggest that employees may not want a union even if they
have real grievances because they believe unions lead to more
problems than solutions.
Several authors in this Symposium call for unions to improve firm
competitiveness through their voice effects, or what Joel Rogers calls
20. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
21. See Clyde Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structural Exception to
Section 8 (a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 129 (1993).
22. For works that look at the diversity of firm practices, see generally Peter D. Sherer &
Kyungmook Lee, Cores, Peripheries, and More and Less: An Examination of Mixes of Labor
Relationships in Firms, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FoURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 317 (John F. Burton, Jr., ed., 1993); Paul Oster-
man, How Common Is Workplace Transformation and How Can We Explain Who Adopts It?
(1993) (working paper, on file with the Sloan School of Management, MIT); Sherer & Lee,
Variation from the Standard Employment Relationship, supra note 3.
23. See Hyde, supra note 11, at 155-58.
24. Id. at 172-77.
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"democratic productivism." 25 The general point is that unions can
play a positive role in firm competitive advantage rather than simply
exact rents from firms' competitive advantage or monopoly powers.
Joel Rogers' specific strategy for unions is to press both firms and the
state to move to greater uniformity in practices through imposing
standards at the work place. The question here is whether such uni-
formity contributes to firm competitiveness at the firm or micro level.
If firm heterogeneity or idiosyncracies do not contribute to competi-
tive advantage, then Rogers' proposal makes good sense. However, if
firms have idiosyncratic practices that contribute to their unique capa-
bilities and hence competitive advantage over other firms-what the
resource-based approach in the business strategy literature increas-
ingly tells us is a key basis for firm competitive advantage 26-then
firms will surely resist the pressure for uniformity and standards.
Even given the latter scenario, though, there still could be a role for
unions. Craft-like or professional-like unions could train workers in
transportable or general skills which firms might need.
Matt Finkin takes a different approach to promoting EVR by
suggesting the possibility of nonmajority union representation.27 As
noted earlier, associate unionism has been the labor movement's an-
swer to nonmajority representation: an associate union would be the
exclusive agent of a nonmajority who wanted representation. Matt
Finkin's proposal goes further by allowing for plural unions in one
work place.28 Plural unionism would provide the freedom of associa-
tion for workers that Joel Rogers persuasively argues for in this Sym-
posium, and it might provide the incentives for unions to compete
amongst themselves in ways that get them to innovate. The intriguing
question is how would nonmajority unionism work in a plant with em-
ployee involvement and participation plans or a majority union? Matt
Finkin's proposal is also important in that it makes us recognize that
experimentation with EVR can occur within firms and their establish-
ments as well as across firms and their establishments. Law has a role
in allowing both types of experimentation to occur.
Other proposals suggest a multiple stakeholder model of the firm
as the means to promote EVR. Such a relational model involves a
25. Rogers, supra note 7, at 112.
26. See Peter Cappelli & Harbir Singh, Integrating Strategic Human Resources and Strategic
Management, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES
165, 182 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1992).
27. See Finkin, supra note 17.
28. Id. at 213-18.
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consensus that there are many stakeholders in the firm, not just stock-
holders, and that employees as key stakeholders have a long-term re-
lationship and voice in firm matters that affect them. 29 As Michael
Gottesman argues, the legal "deck" in the United States is stacked
toward a stockholder model and against the stakeholder model.30 The
view that dominates in the U.S. is that corporate officers and boards
of directors have a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, which is
operationalized as maximizing shareholders' value. Given these
points, it is not surprising that David Lewin and I found that a sample
of American senior executives ranked employees as the fourth most
important stakeholder, with stockholders first, customers second, and
suppliers ranked third.31
In contrast, as Ronald Dore has so vividly described, Japanese
firms view employees as key stakeholders.32 Japanese corporate,
bankruptcy, and antitrust laws support and reflect this relational
model. Japanese corporate law includes employees in its definition
and conception of the firm. Japanese bankruptcy law requires that
employees receive debt payments ahead of other creditors. Friendly
banks provide a significant portion of the equity capital that Japanese
firms require; stock and stockholders play less of a role in a firm gain-
ing access to capital as compared to the U.S. firms.
How do authors in this Symposium suggest moving away from
the stockholder model to a stakeholder model? Sam Estreicher ar-
gues that law should encourage longer-term horizons. 33 Unions and
management should be encouraged to have long-term contracts and to
engage in information sharing rather than information hoarding.
Management, he argues, should be encouraged by tax and corporate
law to be less driven by the stock market and short-term share price.
Gottesman's answer is deceptively simple: give employees stock own-
ership so that they are stockholders cum stakeholdings in firms.34
Whether a stakeholder model is appropriate in all cases is cer-
tainly subject to question. There may be times when firms need to
respond much more quickly and dramatically than such relational
29. Ronald Dore, Japan's Version of Managerial Capitalism, in TRANSFORMING ORGANIZA-
TIONS 17, 18 (Thomas A. Kochan & Michael Useem eds., 1992).
30. Gottesman, supra note 8, at 91.
31. See Lewin & Sherer, supra note 3.
32. Dore, supra note 29, at 24.
33. Estreicher, supra note 14, at 40-42.
34. See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 93-96.
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models ordinarily allow. When that is the case, a more transactional
or stockholder model makes more sense.35
Given the diversity of the suggestions for promoting EVR, it is
clear that no single model of EVR has come to supplant the New Deal
legislation, nor might that need to be true at a future date. Different
approaches to EVR are parts of more relational, traditional, as well as
more transactional relationships that organizations have with their la-
bor. The role of law should be to enable this variety to flourish.
35. See Franklin Allen & Peter D. Sherer, The Design and Redesign of Organizational
Form, in REDESIGNING ThE FIRM (Bruce Kogut & Edward Bowman eds., forthcoming 1994).

